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Abstract
We develop a macroeconomic framework where money is
supplied against only few eligible securities in open mar-
ket operations. The relationship between the policy rate,
expected in ation and consumption growth is aected by
money market conditions, i.e. the varying liquidity value of
eligible assets and the associated risk. This induces a liquid-
ity premium, which explains the observed systematic wedge
between the policy rate and consumption Euler interest rate
that standard models equate. It further implies a dampened
response of consumption to policy rate shocks that is hump-
shaped when we account for realistic central bank transfers
and the dynamics of bond holdings.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last decades monetary policy has mainly been viewed as the science of controlling
short-term interest rates and keeping in ation expectations in line with central bank targets.
The current nancial crises has however shifted attention towards the central banks’ supply of
money. In particular, an exceptionally large increase in the demand for liquidity has revealed
that access to central bank money is actually constrained by the availability of scarce collat-
eral. The fact that central banks typically supply money in exchange for eligible securities
is not only relevant in times of crises, but also matters for asset pricing and macroeconomic
eects of monetary policy in normal times, which will be shown in this paper.
We develop a macroeconomic model where money policy is modelled as an asset exchange,
which is usually neglected in current macroeconomic theory.2 Accounting for the fact that
only few securities are eligible for central bank transactions in open market operations pro-
vides a novel perspective on the relation between monetary policy, interest rates and real
activity. The crucial property of the model is that monetary policy determines the liquidity
of securities by declaring them as eligible or not. It is well-established from nance studies
(e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole, 2001, Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) that dierences in market
liquidity of assets can aect pricing kernels. We contribute to this research by deriving a liq-
uidity premium on interest bearing assets that originates in monetary policy implementation.
We show that changes in the policy rate are not one-for-one passed through to all short-term
interest rates, without introducing arbitrage opportunities. As a consequence, the eects
of monetary policy on private savings and real activity dier from what standard models
predict, where the rate of intertemporal substitution (and thus expectations of growth in the
marginal utility of consumption) solely depends on the real policy rate.
The focus on short-term interest rate as central banks’ operating targets in contemporary
macroeconomic studies has been accompanied by the consumption Euler equation replacing
money demand as the link between monetary policy and private sector behavior. By relat-
ing the policy rate to consumption growth and in ation, the consumption Euler equation
governs monetary transmission. The widely known failure of Euler equations to explain the
magnitude of risk-free interest rates (see Weil, 1989) has — until now — not been accounted
for in mainstream macroeconomics, where the policy rate is usually assumed to equal the
consumption Euler rate. However, recent studies report an even more worrying mismatch:
the Euler rate implied by consumption and in ation data as well as its spread to short-term
interest rates are both negatively related to the federal funds rate, while consumption and
in ation seems to be much less volatile than implied by an Euler equation (see Canzoneri
2In small scale New Keynesian models, like Clarida et al.’s (1999) model or Woodford’s (2003) textbook
model, as well as in larger macroeconomic models, like Christiano et al.’s (2005) or Smets and Wouters’ (2008)
model, money is either omitted (assuming a cashless economy) or supplied via lump-sum transfers.3
et al., 2007, and Atkeson and Kehoe, 2009). This failure of the Euler equation casts severe
doubts on the tight link between the monetary policy rate, consumption growth and in ation
implied by standard models.
In this paper account for the implementation of monetary policy in a macroeconomic
model and consider three interest rates: a repo rate for open market operations controlled
by the central bank (the policy rate), an interest rate on short-term government bonds (the
bond rate), and an interest rate on private debt (the debt rate or Euler rate). The model
can generate a substantial spread between the debt rate and the bond rate, i.e. a liquidity
premium,3 and a small spread between the bond rate and the policy rate, i.e. a pure risk pre-
mium. The focus of our analysis is on the liquidity premium, which contributes to explaining
the risk-free-rate puzzle and the above mentioned Euler rate correlations.4 Specically, the
liquidity premium varies endogenously with the expected costs of transforming bonds into
means of payment. Consistent with empirical evidence, we show that the liquidity premium
and the Euler rate can be negatively related to the policy rate. At the same time, the impact
of a rise in the policy rate on aggregate demand and in ation is dampened compared to stan-
dard models (where the central bank sets the Euler rate), while the consumption response is
hump shaped.
The model mainly diers from a standard macroeconomic model by three assumptions:
rst,w ea s s u m et h a tnancial markets are separated. The asset market, where agents trade
interest bearing assets and cash, opens at the end of each period. Before, the money market
opens, where agents can acquire cash from the central bank in exchange for eligible securities
discounted with the rate set by the central bank, i.e., the policy rate. Eligible securities that
are bought today can be cashed in the next period at the policy rate. The bond rate is
therefore closely linked to the expected future repo rate in open market operations, while the
spread between these rates increases on average with aggregate uncertainty and investors’
relative risk aversion. Thus, the bond rate and the policy rate dier due to a risk premium.
Second, we consider central banks’ practice (like the Fed’s or the BoE’s in normal times)
and assume that only short-term government bonds are eligible in open market operations,
while other — especially privately issued — debt securities cannot be cashed in at the central
bank.5 The crucial property is that the amount of eligible assets is not unlimited. Access
3Other macroeconomic studies that have derived a liquidity premium for bonds include Bansal and Coleman
(1996), Lagos (2006), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2007), and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).
4Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) and Eisfeldt (2007) conclude that the demand for short-term treasury securi-
ties (T-bills) cannot solely be explained with consumption smoothing, and suggest considering a transactions
demand for liquid assets.
5This assumtion, which has also been made by Lacker (1997) for the anaylsis of dierent payment system
tools, accords to the Fed’s asset aquisition policy before the recent nancial crises. In 2006, for example,
Treasury bills were the largest position accounting for one-third of the System Open Market Account (SOMA)
holdings. Bills and Treasury coupon securities with a maturity below 2 years accounted for about two-third
of SOMA holdings, while treasury securities of longer maturities and a relatively small amount of Treasury4
to money is thus bounded by private sector government bond holdings and cannot be eased
by holding other assets. Due to this property, government bonds are perceived as a closer
substitute for cash, which gives rise to a liquidity premium.6 Thus, in equilibrium we can
observe a spread between the bond rate and the interest rate on privately issued debt. The
debt rate, which corresponds to the above mentioned consumption Euler rate, thus diers
from the bond rate (and thus the policy rate), while the spread depends on the state of the
economy. In particular, a higher policy rate raises the price of money in terms of bonds, i.e.
reduces the amount of money per unit of bonds supplied to the central bank, and therefore
leads to a decline in the liquidity premium, consistent with Canzoneri et al.’s (2007) and
Atkeson and Kehoe’s (2009) ndings.
Third, we assume, in line with central bank practice (see e.g. Meulendyke, 1998), that the
central bank reinvests payos from maturing securities in new assets. The associated interest
earnings are then transferred to the scal authority, while nancial wealth is held by the
central bank as the counterpart of outstanding money.7 As a consequence, the distribution of
eligible securities between the private sector and the central bank changes over time and, in
particular, varies with the monetary policy stance. This property leads to an additional eect
of monetary policy on the private sector behavior, specically, a hump-shaped consumption
response to monetary policy shocks.
We nd that monetary transmission is substantially aected by these assumptions, in
particular, when the constraint in open market operations (“discounted value of bonds held
by the private sector  new money”) is binding.8 Consider, for example, an unexpected
increase in the policy rate, i.e. a positive innovation to a Taylor-type feedback rule for the
policy rate. Aggregate demand is constrained by the amount of short-term bonds discounted
with the policy rate (plus money carried over from the previous period), which represents
the amount of money the private sector can get through open market operations. Hence, a
higher policy rate has a negative eect on nominal consumption and — due to imperfectly
 exible prices — also on real consumption.9 Monetary policy thereby impacts on the level of
real consumption rather than on its growth rate, as implied by standard models. When the
in ation-indexed securities completed the porfolio.
6To be more precise, there are two interest rate dierentials due to the liquidity of assets: l=) the spread
between the rates of return on money and government bonds, and ll=) the spread between the rates of return
on private debt and bonds. The liquidity premium in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), for example, equals the
dierence between the expected return on (partially re-saleable) equity and money, and thus relates to l=).
Throughout the paper, we will focus on ll=).
7This diers from the common assumption in general equilibrium macro-models that the central bank
transfers seigniorage (dened as the change in the monetary base) to the scal authority.
8In this case, where other assets oer a higher interest rate, household economize on holdings of bonds
and hold bonds only for transaction purposes. This property is for example consistent with Eisfeldt’s (2007)
results. Calibrating a model to match US data, she shows that intertemporal consumption decisions can
contribute to explaining the demand for short-term T-bills only to an extremely small extent.
9For the analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism we consider sticky prices to account for realistic
in ation dynamics.5
central bank increases its policy rate, part of that increase re ects a decrease in the liquidity
premium such that the eects on consumption growth and in ation are dampened compared
to a standard model.
Moreover, due to the third assumption (see above), the rise in the policy rate further
aects consumption through its impact on the distribution of eligible securities. If, for exam-
ple, monetary policy is tightened by an inertial increase of the policy rate, the central bank
demands more bonds in exchange for money. With reduced bond holdings, the open market
constraint tends to become even tighter in the next period, leading to a hump-shaped decline
in consumption. Hence, an unexpected increase in the policy rate can lead to a decline in
the consumption growth rate, which — together with lower expected in ation — implies the
Euler-rate to fall, consistent with empirical evidence.
The analysis further shows that a higher ratio of money supplied under repurchase agree-
ments relative to money supplied outright increases the eectiveness of changes in the policy
rate, which provides an argument for central banks to create a “structural deciency” with
respect to the outright supply of money, like the Fed.10 Finally, we expect the model devel-
oped in this paper to contribute to the solution of the so-called liquidity puzzle and to serve
as an ideal framework for the analysis of unconventional policy options at the zero lower
bound (ZLB) on interest rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on short-term
interest rates and spreads. In section 3, the model is developed. In section 4, we examine the
behavior of interest rates and spreads in the model. Section 5 presents quantitative results
and discusses the monetary transmission mechanism. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
This section examines the empirical behavior of dierent interest rates that will be considered
in the model and the relationships between them. We will consider an Euler rate UHxohu (or
Ug) i.e., the rate implied by the consumption Euler equations, a policy rate Up,i . e . t h e
price of money in terms of bonds in open market operations, and an interest rate U on an
asset that the central bank accepts in exchange for money in its open market operations.
These two interest rates, Up and U, evidently correspond to the federal funds rate and to
the t-bill rate. The interest rate U can alternatively be interpreted in our model as the price
of money (in terms of bonds) outside open market operations. Hence, one might also consider
the US$-libor rate as an interest rate that corresponds to U. In both cases, t-bill or libor
rate, the average spread to the federal funds rate is very small, and usually a few basis points
below or above zero.
10See "Fedpoint: Open Market Operations", http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html).6
G i v e nt h a te m p i r i c a l l ya n di nt h em o d e lb o t hUp and U move relatively close to each other
and contrast signicantly with the behavior of UHxohu, we disregard the dierence between Up
and U for the empirical analysis. To facilitate comparisons with related studies, we will focus
on the spread between the federal funds rate and the Euler rate in this section. First, the
empirical interest rate implied by standard Euler equations is computed. The methodology
is similar to Fuhrer (2000) and Canzoneri et al. (2007). According to a standard Euler













where  is the discount factor, xf is marginal utility of consumption, and S is the price
level. With a standard CRRA utility function, leading to a marginal utility of consumption
xf>w = f3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where w = Sw@Sw31. Equation (2) is used to compute the implied standard (net) Euler
interest rate uHxohu
w = UHxohu
w  1, where the conditional moments are estimated from a six-
variable VAR , \w = D0 + D1\w31 + yw,a s s u m i n gy q l=l=g=Q (0>	),  =2and  = =993.
The variables included in \ (1966Q1-2008Q2) are log per capita real personal consumption
expenditures on nondurable goods and services, log change in the de ator of this consumption
measure, log price of industrial commodities, log per capita real disposable personal income,
federal funds rate up
w = Up
w  1, and log per capita real non-consumption GDP.11 Moreover,
a segmented (1974Q1) time trend is included in D0.
Figure 1 displays the computed standard Euler interest rate and the federal funds rate,




w , in percent. The
Euler rate uHxohu
w averages at 11=4 percent, whereas the federal funds rate up
w averages at 6=5
percent; thus the average spread is 4.9 percentage points. In ation averages at 4=4 percentage
points over the period considered. The federal funds rate and the Euler rate, which should be
identical according to standard macroeconomic models, display no apparent co-movement.
The federal funds rate is strongly negatively correlated with the spread, a fact that has
recently been pointed out by Atkeson and Kehoe (2009), while using Smets and Wouter’s
(2007) model. Thus, the unexplained wedge between the federal funds rate and the Euler
rate is substantially related to the federal funds rate.At low frequency, the Euler and federal
funds rates are positively correlated, which is mainly due to in ation trends (upward in the
11Quarterly data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database and are released by the
Federal Reserve Board, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce), the Bureau of
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Figure 1: Euler rate uHxohu and federal funds rate up (in %)
1970s and then downward in the 1980s) that move both rates in the same direction. These
trends evidently distort the correlation between the Euler and policy rates in comparison to
a theoretical environment with constant steady-state in ation. In order to correct for these
in ation trends and to isolate short-run (business cycle) interest rate dynamics from longer
term movements, we HP-lter ( =1 6 0 0 ) the interest rate series. The correlations between
HP-ltered variables will be used to assess theoretical moments of our model, which will be
computed for a xed steady-state in ation rate.
Table 1 Empirical correlations for HP-ltered series






















Figure 2 displays the same variables as in Figure 1 but HP-ltered. The bold line is minus
the detrended federal funds rate. Thus, there is an apparent negative comovement between
 uctuations of the spread and of the policy rate. Moreover, the Euler and policy rates are
also negatively correlated at business cycle frequency. Table 1 presents the correlations for
the HP-ltered series, i.e., the (unconditional) correlations between the federal funds rate,
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Figure 2: HP-ltered Euler rate uHxohu and federal funds rates up (in %)




w ), which corresponds to
the Euler rate in our model.12 Three main results should be noted: rst, there is a strong
negative correlation (close to minus one) between the spreads and the policy rate. Second,
the Euler (debt) rate and the policy rate are negatively correlated as well, though to a smaller
extent than the spreads.13 Third, the correlations for the Euler rate and the debt rate are
relatively similar.
As emphasized by Atkeson and Kehoe (2009), the apparent mismatch between the Euler
and federal funds rates casts severe doubts on the common practice in current macroeconomics
to assume that both rates are identical. We will show in the subsequent sections that this
behavior of interest rates can be explained by modeling monetary policy in accordance with
central bank practice.
12Details on this latter rate can be found in the subsequent section and in appendix 8.2. The dierence
between the standard Euler equation and the Euler equation in our model is mainly due to a cash-in-advance
constraint. Overall, these two rates dier only slightly, except in accelerating in ation (late 1970s) and
disin ation (early 1980s) episodes, as well as around 1992 and 2003 with the drops in the policy rate.
13This relates to the results in Canzoneri et al. (2007) for the case of real rates. Their correlation between
real rates is smaller than the values given in our table 1, and they nd a positive correlation between nominal
rates, which is due to the in ation trends, as explained above.9
3T h e m o d e l
In this section we develop a macroeconomic framework where the asset market and open
market operations (the money market) are separated. There are four dierent types of
agents: households, rms, the central bank and the government. We abstract from nancial
intermediation and assume that households directly trade with the central bank in open
market operations.
Households can hold short-term government bonds (i.e. T-bills) and non-interest bearing
money, and they can borrow and lend among each other using a full set of nominally state
contingent claims. Their demand for money is induced by assuming that goods market
transactions cannot be conducted by using credit. This is modelled by a cash-in-advance
constraint, i.e. by assuming that households have to hold money for goods market purchases.
They can get money from the central bank only in exchange for eligible securities in open
market operations. To give a preview, nancial markets separation will lead to a spread
between the government bond rate and the policy (repo) rate, i.e. a risk premium, whereas
the spread between the debt rate and the bond rate, i.e. a liquidity premium, will be due to
the special role of government bonds in open market operation.
Throughout the paper, upper case letters denote nominal variables, lower case letters real
variables, and variables without an index (l or m) aggregate variables.
3.1 Timing of events
The timing of markets and the specication of open market operations will be important
for our results. We will focus on the case where only government bonds are eligible in open
market operations. The timing of events in each period is as follows:
Ah o u s e h o l dl enters a period w with nominal assets carried over from the previous
period w  1:
PK
l>w31 + El>w31 + Gl>w31>
where PK denotes holdings of money, E one-period government bonds, and G one-
period state privately issued contingent claims.
1. Aggregate shocks materialize, labor is supplied by households, and goods are produced
by rms.
2. Households can then trade money in exchange for eligible assets in open market op-
erations. The central bank supplies via outright sales/purchases and via repurchase
agreements. The relative price of money Up
w (for both types of trades) is controlled by




where Ll>w is the amount of money received by household l and Ef
l>w the amount of
bonds the central bank gets. We assume that only government bonds are eligible
Ef
l>w  El>w31= (3)
When household l leaves the money market, its bond holdings equal El>w31  Ef
l>w.
3. Households enter the (nal) goods market, where money is assumed to be the only
accepted means of payment. Thus goods market expenditures are constrained by money
carried over from the previous period plus money acquired from the central bank in
current period open market operations:
Swfl>w  Ll>w + PK
l>w31>
where fl denotes purchases of the nal consumption good and S its price level. When
household l leaves the goods market, its money stock equals Ll>w + PK
l>w31  Swfl>w.
4. Before households trade in the asset market, current labor income and dividends are
paid back in cash to households. Further, government bonds can be repurchased from




l>w. After repurchase agreements are settled, money and bond holdings of
household l equal
f Pl>w = Ll>w + PK
l>w31 + Swzwql>w + Swl>w  Swfl>w  PU
l>w>
e El>w = El>w31  Ef
l>w + EU
l>w>
where zw denotes the real wage rate, qw working time and Swl>w dividends.
5. Finally, the asset market opens. In the asset market, households receive payosf r o m
maturing debt. They can further borrow/lend and trade money and bonds among each
other, and they can buy bonds from the government at the price 1@Uw (while the price
of money in terms of bonds in the asset market equals Uw). Hence, we can summarize
the asset market constraint of household l as
(El>w@Uw)+Hw[tw>w+1Gl>w]+PK
l>w  e El>w + Gl>w31 + f Pl>w + Sww> (4)
where Sww denotes lump-sum government transfers and tw>w+1 is a stochastic discount
factor, which will be dened below. The central bank reinvests its payosf r o mm a t u r i n g
bonds in new bonds and does not change money supply. Since money cannot be issued
by the private sector,




The total amount of government bonds held by the private sector at the end of the period
R
El>wgl will depend on how many bonds are issued by the scal authority and held by the11
central bank. In what follows we describe the model in detail.
3.2 Private sector
Households There is a continuum of innitely lived households indexed with l 5 [0>1].
Households have identical asset endowments and identical preferences. Household l maximizes





where H0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set, and  5
(0>1) is the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility x is assumed to satisfy
xw =[ ( f13
l>w  1)(1  )
31]  ql>w,w h e r e  1 and A0.
Ah o u s e h o l dl is initially endowed with money PK
l>31, government bonds El>31, and pri-
vately issued debt Gl>31. As described above, it faces three constraints in each period. In
open market operations, it can acquire additional money Ll>w up to the amount of government
bonds carried over from the previous period Ew31 discounted by Up
w . Hence, privately issued
debt is not eligible in open market operations, which accords to common practice of central
banks (like the BoE or the US-Fed in normal times) to restrict the set of eligible securities
mainly to short-term government bonds (see e.g. Meulendyke, 1998). Accordingly, we assume
that only government bonds can be used as collateral for money in open market operations,
such that household l faces the following open market constraint
Ll>w  El>w31@Up
w = (6)
In principle, the central bank can also withdraw money from the private sector (Ll>w ?
0). Here, however, we focus on the empirically relevant case where the central bank cre-
ates a “structural deciency” when it supplies money outright (PK),14 b yc h o o s i n gap a r -
ticular relation between money supplied under repurchase agreements and under outright
sales/purchases. This strategy leads to a su!ciently large fraction of money that will be
supplied under repurchase agreements to guarantee Ll>w  0 in equilibrium (see below).
Households are further assumed to rely on cash for transactions in the goods market.
Given that they can rst trade with the central bank in open market operations, the cash-
in-advance constraint diers from Svensson’s (1985) cash-in-advance constraint by Ll>w
Swfl>w  Ll>w + PK
l>w31= (7)
14This strategy has for example been applied by the US-Federal Reserve: "To most eectively in uence the
level of reserve balances, the Federal Reserve has created what is called a ’structural deciency’. That is, it has
created permanent additions to the supply of reserve balances that are somewhat less than the total need. Then
on a seasonal and daily basis, the Desk is in a position to add balances temporarily to get to the desired level."
(see "Fedpoint: Open Market Operations", http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html).12
In the asset market, the household receives pay-o from maturing assets, can buy bonds from
the government, and can trade all assets with other households. It can further borrow and
lend using a full set of nominally state contingent claims. Dividing the period w price of one
unit of nominal wealth in a particular state of period w+1by the period w probability of that
state gives the stochastic discount factor tw>w+1.T h ep e r i o dw price of a payo Gmw in period
w +1is then given by Hw[tw>w+1Gmw]. Substituting out the stock of bonds and money held
b e f o r et h ea s s e tm a r k e to p e n s , e El>w and f Pl>w, in (4), the asset market constraint of household
l reads can be written as
(El>w@Uw)+Hw[tw>w+1Gl>w]+PK
l>w +( Up
w  1)Ll>w (8)
 El>w31 + Gl>w31 + PK
l>w31 + Swzwql>w  Swfl>w + Swl>w + Sww>
where household l0v borrowing is restricted by the following no-Ponzi game condition
lim
v<"Hwtw>w+vGl>w+v  0> (9)
as well as by PK
l>w  0 and El>w  0.T h e t e r m (Up
w  1)Ll>w in (8) measures the costs of
money acquired in open market operations: the households receive new cash Ll>w in exchange
for Up
w Ll>w bonds.
Maximizing the objective (5) subject to the open market constraint (6), the goods market
constraint (7), the asset market constraints (8) and (9), for given initial values Pl>31, El>31,
and Gl>31 leads to the following rst order conditions for working time ql>w, consumption fl>w,
additional money Ll>w, as well as holdings of contingent claims, government bonds and money:
xl>qw@zw =l>w> (10)




























where l>w and #l>w denote the multiplier on the asset and goods market constraint. The
conditions (10) and (11) show that l>w A 0 and that a binding goods market constraint
(#l>w A 0) distorts the intratemporal consumption-leisure decision in a conventional way,
xl>fw + xl>qw@zw = #l>w. Combining (10) and (11) with (15), discloses the standard in ation
tax on consumption, which is implied by the cash-in-advance constraint (7):
Hw [xl>fw+1@w+1]=xl>qw@zw= (16)13
Throughout, we will repeatedly refer to the rate of return on a nominally risk-free portfolio
of claims that deliver one unit of currency in each state. This debt rate Ug
w is given by
Ug
w =[ Hwtw>w+1]
31 and thus (see 13)
1@Ug
w = Hw [(l>w+1@l>w)@w+1] (17)
The debt rate closely relates to the Euler rate in section 2. It can dier from the standard
Euler rate (see 1) solely due to the cash-credit-good friction l>w  xl>fw (see 11). To facilitate
comparisons, we will report results for both rates, though the Euler rate has no meaningful
role in the model.
The open market constraint (6) is associated with the multiplier l>w  0, which measures
the liquidity value of bonds. When the goods market constraint is binding: #l>w A 0 /
xl>fw + xl>qw@zw A 0 (see 10 and 11), the role of money as a means of payment is positively
valued. Likewise, government bonds, as a substitute for money, can also be valued dierently
from non-eligible assets; for this, the price of money in terms of bonds Up has to be su!ciently









The multiplier on the open market constraint l>w, tends to decline with the policy rate (see
18), since a higher policy rate reduces the amount of money for each unit of bonds supplied to
the central bank. The bond pricing equation (14) shows that a rise in this multiplier tends to
lower the interest rate on bonds. Hence, a positive liquidity value of bonds l>w A 0 gives rise
to a liquidity premium between the interest rate on bonds and the debt rate, vw = Ug
w Uw A 0,













The household’s investment decisions further links the bond rate to the policy rate. It is
willing to hold both assets, money and bonds, if the rate of return on bonds compensates for
the costs of acquiring new money in the next period. This can be seen by combining (10),











implying that the interest rate on bonds equals the expected future policy rate up to rst
order. Finally, the transversality conditions for money, bonds, and private debt as well as
the following complementary slackness conditions are satised in the household’s optimum
l)0  el>w3131
w @Up







ll)0  ll>w + pK
l>w3131









l>w@Sw, el>w = El>w@Sw,a n dll>w = Ll>w@Sw, and (8) and (9) hold with equality.
Households are then willing to hold both types of money, i.e. money held under repurchase
agreements PU
l>w and under outright sales/purchases PK
l>w. Changes in the composition of
money supplied to the private sector might aect the distribution of eligible securities between
the private sector and the central bank.
In the following sections, we will particularly be interested in the case where the open
market constraint (6) is binding, l>w A 0. It should however be noted that this does not imply
that scal policy (or total government debt) is decisive for the maximum amount of money
supplied. A more elaborate set-up could for example also contain longer term government
bonds that are accepted to a smaller extend by the Fed in exchange for money than short-
term government bonds (see e.g. Federal Reserve of New York, 2006).15 W h i l ew ea s s u m e ,
for simplicity, that all one period government bonds are eligible, central banks in practice
typically decide on the fraction of eligible securities that they actually accept in open market
operations. In fact all main results derived in this paper will not be aected either if we add
non-eligible government bonds with longer maturity or if we assume that only a fraction of
government bonds are accepted in open market operations.16
Firms To facilitate a reasonable transmission of monetary shocks we allow for imperfectly
 exible prices. We introduce price stickiness in a simple way following the New Keynesian
literature. In particular, we assume that the nal consumption good is an aggregate of
dierentiated goods produced by monopolistically competitive rms indexed with m 5 [0>1].








mw gm> with A1,w h e r e|w is the
number of units of the nal good, |mw the amount produced by rm m,a n d the constant
elasticity of substitution. Let Smw and Sw denote the price of good m set by rm m and the price
index for the nal good. The demand for each dierentiated good is |mw =( Smw@Sw)





mw gm.Arm m produces good |m employing the technology: |mw = dwq
mw,w h e r e
 5 (0>1), d is a stochastic productivity level satisfying dw = d
d
w31 exp%d>w, d  0,a n d%d>w is
i.i.d. normally distributed with Hw31%d>w =0a constant standard deviation vw=ghy=(%d)  0.
Hence, labor demand satises
zw = pfmw|mw@qmw> (21)
where pfmw denotes real marginal costs.
We consider a nominal rigidity in form of staggered price setting as in Yun (1995). Each
period rms may reset their prices with the probability 1  ! independently of the time















, which can be associated with a "term premium" compared to one-period
(eligible) government bonds 1@U
o
w $ (1@Uw)Hw (1@Uw+1).
16In particular, by extending the type of eligible securities or by reducing the fraction of accepted government
bonds, the central bank can freely chose its long-run in ation target (see section 3.5 for a discussion).15
elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction ! 5 [0>1) of rms is assumed to adjust their
prices with the steady state in ation rate ,w h e r ew = Sw@Sw31, such that Smw = SK>mw31.
In each period a measure 1  ! of randomly selected rms sets new prices e Smw in order
to maximize the expected sum of discounted future dividends Swmw =( Smw  Swpfw)|mw :
max h Smw Hw
P"
v=0 !vtw>w+v(e Smw|mw+v  Sw+vpfw+v|mw+v),s . t .|mw+v = e Smw
3S
w+v|w+v.F o r !A0,
















Aggregate output is |w =( SW
w @Sw)q




mw gm and thus (SW





(1  !)e S3
w . Under  exible prices ! =0 , real marginal costs are given by pfw = %31
% .
3.3 Public sector
The public sector consists of a government and a central bank. The government issues one-
period bonds EW, which are held by households and by the central bank. For simplicity, we
assume that the supply of government bonds is exogenously determined and is issued at a




It should be noted we do not aim at modelling the evolution of total public debt by (23).
Of course, public debt also consists of government bonds with longer maturity that might
grow with a rate dierent from ,w h i c hw i l ln o tb em o d e l l e dh e r et ok e e pt h ee x p o s i t i o n
simple. Hence, (23) can be viewed as a supply of a particular asset that the central bank
declares eligible rather than a characterization of total public debt. In order to avoid any
further eects of scal policy we assume that the government can raise or transfer revenues
in a non-distortionary way, Sww. As long as bonds with longer maturities are not eligible
(which roughly accords to common central bank practice), we can therefore neglect them
without any consequences for the analysis of monetary policy eects.
Accounting for the transfers Swp









The central bank supplies money in exchange for government bonds in open market operations
in form of outright sales/purchases PK
w and repurchase agreements PU
w . Before the money
market opens, the central bank’s stock of government bonds equals Ef
w31 and the stock of
outstanding money equals PK
w31. It then receives an amount of bonds Ef
w in exchange for
money Lw, and after repurchase agreements are settled its holdings of bonds reduces by EU
w
and the amount of outstanding money by PU
w = EU
w . Before the asset market opens, where16
the central bank can invest in government bonds Ef



















In accordance with the operational practice of central banks we assume that it rolls over
its maturing assets (see e.g. Meulendyke, 1998, ch.7). Thus, we assume that the central
bank also enters the asset market at the end of each period, and reinvests in bonds to the
amount that equals its current stock of maturing debt Ef
w = e Ef











w  1)Lw  Swp
w .
Following common practice (see Meulendyke, 1998), we assume that the central bank
transfers interest earnings from asset holdings to the government:
Swp
w = Ef
w (1  1@Uw)= (24)
Note that these transfers will not be negative in equilibrium, such that the central bank












Thus the central bank receives more bonds from households, when money supply or the policy
rate is high (see 25). The term in brackets on the RHS of (25) accounts for money supplied
under repos, which reduces the latter eect.
Regarding the implementation of monetary policy, we assume that the central bank con-
ducts monetary policy by using simple instrument rules. The central bank sets the policy rate
Up
w contingent on its own lags, current in ation, and current real activity, which is measured
as in Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). To assess the monetary transmission mechanism, we







13U (w@)(13U)((|w@dw)@(|@d))|(13U) exp%U>w= (26)
where   0, |  0, U  0 and %U>w is normally i.i.d. with Hw31%U>w =0and a constant
standard deviation vw=ghy=(%U)  0. The long-run policy rate, Up A 1, and the target
in ation rate, A , can be chosen by the central bank. Note that the interest rate rule
encompasses the case of exogenous interest rate policies,  = | =0 , which we found to be
consistent with local equilibrium determinacy in cases where the open market constraint (6)
17This is dierent in standard models, where central bank transfers seigniorage (dened as the change in
the monetary base) to the government in each period. A discussion of government transfers and central bank
independence can be found in Sims (2003).17
is binding. A short discussion of this property can be found in section 5.1.
In contrast to standard models, where repurchase agreements are not considered, the
central bank has an additional role: it can decide on whether money is traded in form of
outright sales/purchases or in form of repurchase agreements. For simplicity, we assume that









1+l,w h e r ePw is the total money supply, Pw = PK
w + PU
w . We assume that

 A 0 to account for the fact that the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
“structures its outright holdings to maintain a need to routinely add to balances by arranging
repurchase agreements” (see Fed New York, 2006). This “structural deciency”, i.e., the
choice of an appropriate relation between money supplied under repurchase agreements and
under outright sales/purchases, allows the Fed to keep a tight control over the federal funds
rate in a  exible way.
3.4 Rational expectations equilibrium








0 flwgl = fw. Households will not behave dierently and
aggregate asset holdings satisfy ;w  0:
R 1



















0 Ll>wgl = Lw = PK
w  PK
w31 + PU
w ,a n d
EW
w = Ew + Ef
w.
Since the government bond is the single eligible security, its distribution between the
central bank and the private sector will matter. Given that the government issues bonds




w31. Further using (25), the evolution of bonds held by households
satises











Thus, private sector holdings of bonds tend to decrease with a higher price of money Up
and to increase with . For a given injection Lw households further loose less bonds when the
fraction of money held under repurchase agreements increases.
Throughout, we will focus on the case where the central bank sets its instrument such
that the goods market constraint (7) is strictly binding (#w A 0). In the long-run, this is
ensured by a su!ciently large in ation target, A(see section 3.5). A rational expectations
equilibrium can then be dened as follows:





w=0 satisfying the rms’ rst order conditions and the production technology,
the households’ rst order conditions (10)-(15) and the transversality condition, the binding18
goods market constraint Swfw = PK
w + PU






















w ,f o r = eW
w w@eW
w31,
for a monetary policy satisfying (26), given {dw}"
w=0 and initial values P31  0, E31 A 0,a n d
S31 A 0.










the evolution of government bonds will neither aect the equilibrium allocation nor the asso-










In the following analysis, the two cases of a binding and a non-binding open market constraint
(6) will be treated separately, which facilitates analyzing the mechanisms that are responsible
for the main results.18 Throughout the analysis, we are particularly interested in the case
where the open market constraint is binding. The central bank can conduct monetary policy
in a way that ensures the rate of return on government bonds to be lower on average than
the rate of return on private debt in equilibrium. This case is consistent with the empirical
observation that the policy rate has almost always been below the implied Euler rate (see
Figure 1). Households then tend to economize on bond holdings, i.e. they will not hold more
government bonds than necessary for their money market trades. If however both returns
are identical, households can borrow and invest in government bonds without costs such that
the open market constraint will not be binding.19
In order to analyze interest rates and monetary policy for the two regimes in a separate
way, we examine steady states with a binding and a non-binding open market constraint.
We then assume that monetary policy is conducted in a way that implements one particular
steady state and that aggregate shocks are su!c i e n t l ys m a l l ,s ot h a tw ec a na n a l y z et h e
dynamic properties of the economy in the neighborhood of this steady state. A steady state
value of an endogenous variable {w will not carry a time index, {.
To examine the two cases, we use (19) which leads to the following steady state condition






18The set of equilibrium conditions for both cases can be found in the appendix 8.2. To simplify the analysis,
we disregard the long-run dispersion of prices at in ation rates exceeding one.
19Likewise, if the central bank simply declares both assets as eligible for open market operations, the private
sector can freely create any amount of private debt that can be used in exchange for money, such that the
private sector never runs out of eligible securities.19
Thus a strictly positive spread between the debt rate Ug and the bond rate U implies the
multiplier on the open market constraint to be strictly positive A0. The open market
constraint is then binding in the steady state.
Before examining the dierences between both steady states, we look their at common
properties. Throughout the paper, we assume that the central bank successfully implements
its in ation target  in the long-run. The steady state Euler rate is, as usual, determined by








which in steady state demands the multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint (7) to satisfy
#@ = Ug  1 (29)
Together with Ug = @, condition (29) implies that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding
in the steady state, if the in ation target exceeds , A , which will be assumed throughout










while real balances satisfy p = f> pK +pU = p> and pU = 
pK.T h u s ,f o raxed in ation
target A , the steady state values Ug, f, | = f, q = |1@, p, pk and pU are independent
of , i.e. do not depend on the tightness of the money market constraint. Nevertheless,
monetary policy is non-neutral in the long-run due to the in ation tax on consumption (see
30) originating in the cash-credit-good distortion induced by the cash-in-advance constraint
(7). The following proposition summarizes these properties.
Proposition 1 If the central bank sets the in ation target and the steady state policy rate
such that Aand Up ? @  , the goods market constraint and the open market constraint
are binding in the steady state. The equilibrium allocation in the steady state is then identical
to the case where the open market constraint is not binding and independent of the policy
rate.
The open market constraint only matters for the steady state values for the bond rate U and
for the real value of government bonds e.
l=) If the central bank sets the average policy rate Up equal to the debt rate Ug in a steady
state, Up = @, the interest rate on government bonds U = Up (see 20) also equals
Ug. By (28), the multiplier on the open market constraint will then be equal to zero
 =0and the steady state is characterized by U = Ug = Up.S i n c et h eo p e nm a r k e t
constraint is not binding, there are innitely many values for real bonds consistent with
a long-run equilibrium.
ll=) If however the central bank chooses an average policy rate Up that is strictly smaller
than Ug,w h i c hr e q u i r e sUp ? @  , the open market constraint is binding and the20






and e =(   1)eW31 + pU. Combining the latter with (31) and pU = 
pK,s h o w s
that eW will be strictly positive in a non-de ationary steady state. For a realistic
in ation target   1, which will be considered throughout the analysis, (23) implies
that the in ation target equals the growth rate of short-term government bonds,  = .
As mentioned before, we do not interpret the equality  =  (in case ll=) as a restriction
for the central bank’s in ation target to depend on public debt: rst, EW just measures the
supply of short-term government bonds, while total public debt, of course, also contains long-
term bonds that are disregarded in our model for simplicity. And second, the central bank
is in principle free to adjust the set of eligible securities, and can thereby chose an in ation
target that diers from . If, for example, the central bank chooses a smaller in ation target
?, it can simply accept smaller fractions of government bonds in open market operations.
Otherwise, for A, it might also declare other assets (or a fraction of them) as eligible,
which grow with a rate that exceeds .20 In any case, the central bank can actually decide on
the maximum amount of money that can be traded in open market operations by deciding
on the set of eligible securities. Though this is not explicitly modelled in this paper, we
can easily account for these arguments by allowing for a richer asset structure, which will
nevertheless leave the main results unchanged.
4 Interest rates and spreads
In this section, we examine the relation between the three interest rates, i.e., the policy rate
Up
w , the bond rate Uw,a n dt h ed e b tr a t eUg
w. The bond rate Uw and the policy rate Up
w are
closely related to each other as can be seen from (20). The spread between these two rates,
which can be interpreted as a risk premium, will be examined below. Before, we examine the
spread between the debt rate Ug
w and the bond rate Uw, which is a liquidity premium. We
will show that both the spread Ug
w Uw and the debt rate Ug
w itself decrease when the central
bank raises the policy rate Up, which is consistent with the empirical evidence provided in
section 2.
For the analysis in this section we will use a simplied version of the model, to facilitate
the derivation of analytical results. Throughout this section, we assume that production is
linear ( =1 ), the production sector is perfectly competitive ( $4 ), and that prices are
20In light of the decline in the amount of outstanding US-treasury debt, the latter case was in fact viewed as
a relevant issue in 2001. See Board of Governors (2001) for a comprehensive discussion on alternative assets
that were considered for open market purchases. This issue has regained interest in the current nancial crises,
where the Fed and other central banks relaxed their asset acquisition policy.21
perfectly  exible (! =0 ). We further assume in this section that money is only supplied
via repurchase agreements Pw = PU
w (
 $4 ) and that the supply of government bonds is
constant ( =1 ).
4.1 The liquidity premium
Households are willing to hold government bonds even if the bond rate is lower than the
debt rate, since bonds exhibit an additional liquidity value (see 19). Due to lower interest
earnings, households will economize on bond holdings such that the open market constraint
(6) is binding. This property has already been discussed in the previous section, where we
have shown that the central bank can implement a long-run equilibrium with a binding money
market constraint if the policy rate Up i ss e ta tav a l u el o w e rt h a nUg = @ (see proposition
1). In the neighborhood of this steady state, the spread between the debt rate and the bonds
rate will not be constant over time and will in particular be aected by the monetary policy
stance, since the liquidity value of bonds will depend on the money market conditions.
To facilitate an exact analysis of the liquidity premium, we restrict our attention to the
case of an exogenous interest rate policy  = | =0 . Since the current bond rate is aected
by tomorrow’s policy rate rather than today’s policy rate (see 20), we further assume that
the policy rate sequence exhibits inertia U A 0.21 A rise in the policy rate Up
w then has
two immediate eects. It reduces nominal consumption for a given stock of household bond
holdings Ew31 (see 6 and 7). It further leads to lower end-of-period nominal bond holdings
Ew (see 27, which for Pw = PU
w and  =1reduces to Ew = Ew31@Up
w ). Thus, both eects
tend to reduce in ation. Since the policy rate is raised in an inertial way, in ation is also
expected to be lower in the subsequent period, such that households demand a lower debt
rate Ug
w (see 17).
These results can easily be derived for the simplied version when utility is logarithmic
in consumption  =1 .22 They are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the simplied version, where  =1and the policy rate satises
 = | =0and Up ? 1@. Then, in the neighborhood of the steady state the debt rate Ug
w
and the ratio Ug
w@Uw decrease with l=) the current level of the policy rate if U A 0 and ll=)
with the variance of policy rate innovations %U>w.
Proof. See appendix 8.3.
The spread Ug
w  Uw, i.e., the liquidity premium, originates in the ability of bonds to be
convertible into means of payments in open market operations before the goods market opens.
21Under perfectly  exible prices both rates, U
g and U, will be constant if U =0 . This will not be the case
for the calibrated version of the model considered in section 5.
22As mentioned above, the simplied version is further characterized by  =1 ,  <" , ! =0 , l <" ,a n d
K =1 .22
If the costs of exchanging bonds against money Up
w increases, the liquidity value of bonds and
thus the liquidity premium decline. Similarly, when the variance of the policy rate increases,
the liquidity value of bonds becomes more uncertain and the liquidity premium is reduced.
Put dierently, when the costs associated with the liquidation of bonds get more risky, the
compensating interest rate U increases. This eect resembles the concept of a liquidity risk
premium (see Acharya and Pedersen, 2005).
According to the standard Fischer (expected in ation) eect, the debt rate Ug falls in
response to an increase in the policy rate, since in ation is expected be to lower than average
in ation rate in the subsequent period. It should be noted that this in ation response is
further responsible for an increase in consumption, since the in ation tax on cash goods is
then lowered (see 16). This counterfactual consumption response will disappear when prices
are considered to be imperfectly  exible (see section 5).
4.2 The risk premium
As discussed in the previous section, the interest rates on bonds and debt only dier when
the open market constraint is binding. In contrast, there can be a spread between the policy
rate and the bond rate, regardless whether the open market constraint is binding or not.
















Households are willing to hold both, money and bonds, if the rate of return on bonds compen-
sates for the costs of converting bonds into money in next period’s open market operations.
Up to rst order, the current bond price 1@Uw, which is determined in the asset market






. For the case of a binding open market constraint, the price of a government





. The reason is that the covariance
on the RHS of (32) is negative, i.e., the real policy rate Up
w+1 is positively related to the mar-
ginal utility of consumption divided by the in ation rate, xfw+1@w+1. The spread between
the bond rate and the expected policy rate then tends to be positive and increases with the
measure of relative risk aversion . Hence, this spread is a risk premium on the nominal rate
of return on bonds compared to the expected policy rate: a risk-averse agent who considers
i n v e s t i n gi nb o n d si nt h ea s s e tm a r k e tw i l la s kf o rap r i c e1@Uw that is lower than the ex-
pected money-price of bonds in next period’s open market market, if a lower policy rate (and
thus a higher pay-o from bonds) is expected to be associated with higher consumption and
in ation.
To establish this result, we again apply the simplied version of the model ( =  =1 ,
! =0 ,  $4 ,a n d
 $4 ). We now allow for varying degrees of relative risk aversion,23
A1, and we focus on white noise technology shocks, d =0 , as the only source of aggregate
uncertainty, such that %U>w =0 , while the policy rate will endogenously be adjusted according
to  A 0 and U = | =0 . The following proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 3 Consider the simplied version, where A1 and d =0 , while the policy
rate satises  A 0, U = | =0 , %U>w =0and Up ? 1@. Then, in the neighborhood
of the steady state the current price of government bonds is smaller than the expected future





. The average bond rate Uw further increases with
the households’ relative risk aversion and with the variance of productivity shocks.
Proof. See appendix 8.4.
The covariance term in (32) is strictly negative under a binding open market constraint, since
a higher policy rate tends to reduce current consumption times in ation ew31@Up
w = fww.
Then, the bond rate tends to exceed the policy rate and further increases for a given policy
rate, if aggregate risk, vw=ghy=(%d), or the degree of relative risk aversion  increases. In both
cases households are only willing to hold bonds at a higher interest rate U.
5 Numerical analysis
In this section we apply a numerical analysis of a calibrated model. We rst describe how we
calibrate the model, then we re-examine the behavior of interest rates, and nally we explain
the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
5.1 Parameter values
To allow for responses of consumption and in ation that are more realistic than before, we
consider imperfectly  exible prices, !A0. For most of the model’s parameter we apply
standard values for quarterly data (see table A1 in appendix 8.5). In particular, we set the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution , the labor income share , the fraction
of non-optimally price adjusting rms !, and the elasticity of substitution  equal to  =2 ,
 =2 @3, ! =0 =8,a n d =6 ,w h i l e is adjusted to get a steady state value of working
time equal to q =1 @3. The parameters for the stochastic productivity process are taken
from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and are given by d =0 =856 and vw=ghy=(hd)=0 =0064.
The policy rate is set according to an inertial Taylor rule (see 26), where we used parameter
values estimated by Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) for 1984—2004: U =0 =84,  =2 =37,
| =0 =02,a n dvw=ghy=(hU)=0 =0015.
Throughout the analysis, we restrict our attention to locally determined equilibria. When
the open market constraint is not binding, our model reduces to an almost standard New
Keynesian model and local equilibrium determinacy requires interest rate policy to satisfy
the Taylor-principle (like the inertial Taylor-rule). If however the open market constraint is
binding, we nd that local equilibrium determinacy applies regardless whether interest rate24
policy satises the Taylor principle or is exogenous. We will then also apply an exogenous
policy (>| =0and U =0 =84)t oi s o l a t ee ects of exogenous interest rate changes from
eects due to endogenous interest rate adjustments. The reason why local equilibrium de-
terminacy does not rely on an active policy in this case, is that a bounded supply of eligible
securities (23) serves as a nominal anchor similar to the stock of money under a money growth
policy.23
To match the average interest rate presented in section 2, we apply a target quarterly
policy rate equal to Up =1 =0651@4 =1 =0159, a (quarterly) debt rate equal to Ug =1 =1141@4 =
1=0274, leading to a spread v =0 =0115,a n dai n  ation rate equal to  =1 =0441@4 =1 =0108.
The steady state values for Ug and  are linked by the Euler equation, which in the steady
state reads Ug = 31(1+f),w h e r ef is the steady state consumption growth rate. While
real consumption growth rate f is strictly positive in the data, it is neglected in the model,
for simplicity. We therefore set the discount factor  equal to  =0 =984, which is smaller than
values usually applied in the business cycle literature, to compensate for a positive steady
state consumption growth rate (see also King et al., 2002). It turns out that the choice of
 does not signicantly aect the quantitative results. Finally, we chose 1=5 for the policy
parameter 
 to match the observed ratio between total reserves and reserves supplied under
repurchase agreements. This ratio was almost constant in the 2000s before the crisis24.
5.2 Interest rate behavior
In this section we again take a look at the interest rates, which have already been analyzed
qualitatively in section 4. Here, we relate the results of the simulated model to the analytical
results presented in proposition 2 and 3 and to the empirical evidence presented in section
2. To account for the eects of second moments on asset prices, we apply a second order
approximation at the deterministic steady state (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004).25
The main properties of the debt rate and the liquidity premium are summarized in propo-
sition 2. Consistent with the empirical evidence provided in section 2, it implies that both
are negatively correlated with the policy rate. To prove this claim we neglected technology
shocks. Here, we examine the magnitude of the correlations for the calibrated model, where
technology shocks are also considered. Table 2 presents the correlation between the debt rate






the policy rate. It further contains the corresponding values for the Euler rate UHxohu
w and the
23This property of our model is in fact closely related to the determinacy property of the cash-in-advance
model with sticky prices derived in Adao et al. (2003), who examine the case where both, the nominal interest
rate and the supply of money are controlled by the central bank at the same time. A local determinacy
analysis for our model is available upon request from the authors.
24See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Domestic Open Market Operations, various issues, and FRED
database.







,w h e r eUHxohu is the rate implied by a standard Euler
equation, Hw [xf>w+1@(xf>ww+1)] = 1@UHxohu
w ; the latter has no meaningful role in our model
and is only computed to facilitate comparisons.26
The correlations are highly negative when only interest rate shocks are considered (second
column), while they are less pronounced when only technology shocks are considered (third
column). When we consider both types of shocks, the correlations take intermediate values
(see last column). Overall, the correlations between the spreads and the policy rate are larger
in absolute terms than the correlations between the debt rate (or Euler rate) and the policy
rate. In sum, the correlations presented in table 2 come close to the empirical correlations
presented in table 1 in section 2.
Table 2 Unconditional correlations of HP-ltered series ( = 1600)
Interest rate shocks Technology shocks Int. rate & techn. shocks
fruu(vw>U p






















With the parameter values discussed above, the liquidity premium vw ( m e a s u r e di nt e r mo f
the debt rate) exhibits a mean value equal to 490 basis points in terms of annualized rates. In
accordance with the second claim in proposition 2 it declines with the variance of policy rate
innovations %U>w. Increasing the standard deviation of policy rate innovations vw=ghy(hU) from
0=0015 to 0=003 and to 0=006 indeed reduces the mean spread from 490 to 489 and to 487,
respectively. This eect is more pronounced (488 and 483) when the policy rate is assumed
to follow an exogenous process.
As summarized in proposition 3, the risk premium, i.e. the spread between the bond
rate and the policy rate, has been shown to increase with the standard deviation of the
productivity shock vw=ghy=(%d) and the relative risk aversion .T h e s ee ects are also found
in the calibrated version, while the size of the risk premium is extremely small (0=064 basis
points for the benchmark parametrization and 0=095 b a s i sp o i n t sf o r =5 ). We expect
that this spread can be increased if other sources of risk, e.g. shocks related to nancial
intermediation (see Christiano et al., 2007), are also considered in the model, which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
26Here we followed the exposition in proposition 1 and computed spreads for the bond rate. Corresponding
spreads for the policy rate are almost identical.26
5.3 Monetary transmission
In this section we analyze the monetary transmission mechanism. Consider a positive inno-
vation to the policy rate satisfying (26). Figure 3 presents the impulse responses of interest
rates and macroeconomic aggregates for the case where the policy rate is set exogenously
( = | =0and U =0 , black solid line) and for the case where it follows the Taylor type
feedback rule (U =0 =84,  =2 =37, | =0 =02, red marked line). An increase of the policy
rate by 15 basis points (or 60 basis points in terms of annualized rates) from its steady state
value leads to a rise in the bond rate on impact by less than 15 basis points, since the current
bond rate tends to increase with the future expected policy rate (see 32). In contrast, the
debt rate Ug
w falls on impact and is closely followed by the Euler rate UHxohu.T h e s p r e a d
between the debt rate and the bond rate decreases. Both responses are consistent with the
claims made in proposition 1. On impact the spread falls by up to 17% of its steady state
value.
Regarding the consumption response, gure 3 further shows that consumption (which
equals output, |w = fw) declines in a hump-shaped way, which is qualitatively consistent with
VAR evidence (see Christiano et al., 1999). The hump-shaped decline of consumption implies
a fall in its growth rate. This pattern, together with the decline in in ation, is consistent
with a fall in the Euler rate and the debt rate. Notably, hump-shaped impulse responses can
usually not be observed in response to policy rate shocks in simple sticky price models. In
these models consumption typically falls on impact and returns monotonically to its steady
state value, which is consistent with an increase in the consumption growth rate (see also
gure 5 below).
Hump-shaped responses can of course also be generated by sticky price models that con-
tain further features like habits or additional frictions (see Bernanke et al., 1999 or Christiano
et al., 2005). Here, the shape of the consumption response is mainly driven by households’
holdings of eligible securities. To get an intuition for this, consider an inertial rise in the
policy rate. Due to the higher relative price of money, households can get less cash in the
same period such that consumption and in ation fall on impact. While the fall in in ation
tends to raise the real value of total government bonds, the share of bonds held by the central
bank increases with higher policy rates (see 25). Thus, a monetary tightening does not only
lead to contractionary eects on impact, but tends to shift the mass of bonds towards the
central bank. With diminishing eligible securities, households can also get less money in the
subsequent periods, such that the initial contraction in consumption will even be enhanced.
Then, the in ation eects starts dominating the interest rate eect and real bond holdings of
households recover. Thus, the distribution of bond holdings aects the transmission of mon-
etary policy shocks, which relies on the assumption that the central bank does not transfer
its wealth to the household at the end of each period.27
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Figure 3: Responses (in % dev. from st.st.) to a policy rate shock for a binding money
market constraint
To illustrate this dierence, we also consider the counterfactual case where the central
bank transfers back interest earnings and all its nancial wealth at the end of each period,
such that all government bonds are held by households, Ew = EW
w . The black solid line in
gure 4 shows the impulse responses for this case (the red marked lines are the same as
in gure 3). Consumption does not respond in a hump-shaped pattern and the debt rate
actually increases after an rise in the policy rate.
Figure 5 further shows impulse responses to the same policy rate shock for a version
of the model where the money market constraint is not binding. Given that the stock of
government bonds is now irrelevant and the bond rate equals the debt rate, the responses
of the latter, of the spread vw, and of real bonds are not presented. The policy rate is
set according to the Taylor rule, since determinacy now requires the Taylor-principle, like
in standard New Keynesian models. We show responses for our benchmark value of the
subjective discount factor  =0 =984. A line representing a commonly applied value, like  =
0=99, would be almost indistinguishable from the lines in gure 5. Three main observations
should be noted: rst, the current debt rate follows the (expected future) policy rate, which is
inconsistent with the empirical evidence provided in section 2. Second, the output response
does not exhibit a hump shape, like in standard models where the distribution of asset
holdings is irrelevant. Third, the eects of the same policy shock on in ation and on output28
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without central bank bond holdings
benchmark model with Taylor-rule
Figure 4: Responses (in % dev. from st.st.) to an interest rate shock with conventional
central bank transfers
are much more pronounced than for a binding open market constraint. The maximum output
contraction is 60-times larger and the in ation contraction is 30-times than in the case where
the open market constraint is binding.27
The reason why monetary policy eects are less pronounced in the case of a binding
open market constraint is that a higher policy rate predominantly impacts on the level of
real consumption due to the constraints in the money market and in the goods market.
In contrast, when the open market constraint is not binding, a higher (real) policy rate
immediately aects the growth rate of consumption via the consumption Euler equation.
Put dierently, when the open market constraint is binding, part of an increase in the policy
rate re ects a decrease in liquidity premium (see 14) such that expected consumption growth
and in ation is less aected than in a standard model. Compared to impulse responses of
VARs (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005), the response of consumption in response to a policy
rate shock is about four times smaller in our model with a binding open market constraint
(see gure 3). We expect that this gap can be closed when the model is augmented by
endogenous investments and additional nominal or real rigidities.
27It should be noted that the output eect is more pronounced in our model than in a standard New
Keynesian model, which neglects transaction frictions. Without the cash-credit good friction the impact
output response would be reduced by more than 20%.29
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Figure 5: Responses (in % dev. from st.st.) to an interest rate shock for a non-binding money
market constraint




w , the impact of an interest rate shock under a binding open market
constraint, in particular, the responses of the macroeconomic aggregates, are less pronounced.
The impulse responses to interest rate shocks for a 50% smaller value of 
 are shown in gure
6. The responses show that the size of interest rate shock eects depends on the way the central
bank conducts open market operations. The impact of a higher policy rate on consumption
is less pronounced (i.e. the maximum contraction is reduced by 1@3) for a smaller share of
money supplied under repos. Hence, by creating a larger “structural deciency” with respect
to the outright supply of money, the central bank can increase the eectiveness of its actions.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we developed a macroeconomic framework where monetary policy implementa-
tion is modelled in a way that accounts for three fact that are typically neglected in standard
macroeconomic models. First, the asset market is separated from the open market operations
where the central bank supplies money in exchange for assets. Second, not all default-risk-
free assets are eligible in open market operations, which gives rise to a liquidity premium on
eligible assets, i.e. T-bills, compared to privately issued debt. Third, the central bank just
transfers interest earnings from holding interest bearing assets, leading to a non-degenerate
distribution of eligible assets.
We show that considering these three facts can help explaining the relation between policy
rates, consumption growth, and the risk free interest rate that is di!cult to account for in
standard models. The existence of a liquidity premium in an arbitrage free equilibrium con-
tributes to the solution of the risk free rate puzzle. The dynamics of the liquidity premium,30
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Figure 6: Responses (in % dev. from st.st.) to an interest rate shock for 
 =0 =75 (black
line) and 
 =1 =5 (red marked line)
in particular in response to policy rate changes, can further account for the systematic move-
ments in the spread between the Euler rate and the policy rate, as recently documented by
Canzoneri et al. (2007) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2008). Moreover, the eect of monetary pol-
icy on the distribution of scarce eligible assets, which gives rise to hump-shaped consumption
responses to policy shocks, can even explain the negative relation between the Euler rate and
the policy rate at business cycle frequencies. Finally, the analysis shows that the responses of
consumption and in ation to a monetary policy shock are substantially dampened compared
to the case where it is counterfactually assumed that the policy rate equals the Euler rate.
Besides the exercises conducted in this paper, this framework can serve as a useful instru-
ment for the analysis of time varying liquidity eects and especially of unconventional policy
options at the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates.31
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8 Appendix
8.1 Computation of the Euler rate
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A rational expectations equilibrium for a binding money market constraint and a binding
goods market constraint is a set of sequences {fw>q w>| w>z w>p U
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sticky prices, and a sequence for household’s bond holdings satisfying
ew  ew3131

















the households’ transversality conditions for money, bonds, and private debt, for a monetary
policy (26), productivity levels {dw}"
w=0 and initial asset endowments. (For convenience, we
neglect higher order terms of the aggregate supply constraint log(w@)=Hw log(w+1@)+
"log(pfw@pf),w h e r e" =( 1 !)(1  !)@!. For a detailed analysis of aggregate supply
under sticky prices, see, e.g., the working paper version of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007).
If the money market constraint is not binding, the sequence of bonds is irrelevant and the35
model can be reduced to a set of equilibrium sequences for {fw>q w>| w>z w>p w>pf w>U p
w >U w>w}"
w=0
given by (37)-(40) pw = fw, xfw = Up
w
3xqw
zw and either pfw = %31
% for  exible prices or
log(w@)=Hw log(w+1@)+"log(pfw@pf) for sticky prices, the tvc’s, and {dw}"
w=0,f o ra
monetary policy (26) and initial values.
8.3 Proof of proposition 2
Applying the parameter restrictions ! =  = | =0 ,  =  =  =1 , A0,a n d
 =  $4 ,

























w+1>U w = HwUp
w+1> (45)
and a monetary policy. Eliminating consumption, the real wage rate, and output, it can





















w. Since this system is log-linear, and shocks
are log-normally distributed, all variables are also log-normal. Thus, the two conditions in
(46) can be written as
Hw logUp
w+1 +( 1 @2)yduw(logUp
w+1)=l o gew  logdw +l o g@log>
logew = logUp
w  logw +l o gew31>
w h e r ew eu s e dt h a tlogHwUp
w+1 = Hw logUp
w+1+(1@2)yduw(logUp
w+1) and yduw ({w+l)=Hwydu({w+l).
Using the logged policy rule logUp
w = logUp
w31 +( 1 )logUp + %w and dening  =
log  log, we get the following expressions for real bonds and in ation
logw =(1 + )logUp
w +l o gew31  logdw  (1@2)yduw(logUp
w+1)  (1  )logUp + > (47)
logew =logUp
w +l o gdw +( 1 )logUp +( 1 @2)yduw(logUp
w+1)  = (48)
To assess the spread between the debt rate and the bonds rate, we apply the conditions in







Taking logs and using logHwUp
w+1 = Hw logUp
w+1 +( 1 @2)yduw(logUp
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Rewriting the last term logHw[d31
w+131
w+1] by using logHw[d31
w+131
w+1]=Hw (logdw+1  logw+1)+
(1@2)yduw (logdw+1  logw+1) and yduw (logdw+1  logw+1)=yduw(logdw+1)+yduw (logw+1)+
2fryw (logdw+1>logw+1),w eg e t
log(Ug
w@Uw)=(1 d)logdw +l o g + logUp




where we used Hw logdw+1 = d logdw and Hw logUp
w+1 = logUp
w +(1 )logUp. Eliminating
Hw logw+1 with (47),
log(Ug
w@Uw)=logdw  ( +2 )l o gUp
w +l o gew  (1@2)Hw[yduw+1(logUp
w+2)]
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+ yduw (logdw+1) as well as
fryw (logdw+1>logw+1)=yduw logdw+1, leads to
log(Ug
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implying that the spread decreases with Up
w and ydu(%),a n dr e q u i r e sUp ? 1@. Further
eliminating logUw =l o gHwUp
w+1 using logHwUp
w+1 = logUp










ydu(%)  log> (50)
which together with (49) establish the claims made in the proposition.37
8.4 Proof of proposition 3
We want to establish the claims made in proposition 3. For ! = (d) = | =0 ,  =  =1 ,
A1,  A 0, ydu% =0 ,a n d
 =  $4 , the model with a binding ope market constraint















where xfw = f3
w , and a policy rule satisfying Up
w = Up(w@). Applying the latter and
xfw =[ ew31@(Up
w w)]
























. In order to examine the impact of the relative risk aversion and
of aggregate uncertainty on the bond rate, we derive the solutions for ew and w. Eliminating
the policy rate in (46), we get two conditions for ew and w:
logew =Hw logw+1 +l o gdw +( 1 @2)2
yduw(logw+1)+2> (52)
(1 + )logw =logew +l o gew31 + 3> (53)
where 2 = log +log +logUp  log and 3 = logUp + log. Since the model
is log-linear, all variables will nally be log-normally distributed. We know that the solutions
can be written in the following generic form
logw =elogew31 + dlogdw + yyduw (logdw+1)+>
logew =ee logew31 + ed logdw + eyyduw (logdw+1)+e>
where the 0v are unknown constants. Inserting these solutions in (52) and (53), the unknown
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2
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where 4 =e x p ( l o glog+
logUp3 log
+1 ) and 5 =e x p ( 
(+2)(logUp3 log)+(+1)(log3log)
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Using these expressions and simplifying, leads to the following solution for the bond rate
Uw = d







Taking unconditional expectations (H0) and using that H0d





w) for d =0 , the mean of the bond rate is given by







and thus increases with ydu(%d
w) and , which establishes the claims made in the proposition.
8.5 Parameter values
Table A1: Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Benchmark values
 Relative risk aversion 2
q Labor in steady state 1@3
 Discount factor 0=984
 In ation target 1=0108
 Substitution elasticity 6
! Price rigidity 0=8
 Labor income share 2@3
v Steady state spread 0=0115

 Share of repos 1=5
d Autocorreletation 0=856
vw=ghy(%d) Standard deviation 0=0064
U Autocorreletation 0=84
 In ation feedback 2=37
| Output feedback 0=02
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